cBnn "~R7 
Introduction
In this paper attention will be focussed on an industry with public enterprises and institutions, rather than on a public enterprise i tself. Public enterprises can be used by the government as an instrument to implement an industrial policy. Since there exist a variety of instruments and objectives, we firstly categorize industries as well as market structures (section 2). Next, we mention some recent results ( section 3).
In the last section a general equilibrium model i s introduced that offers a frsmework to policy makers when designing an efficient organization of an i ndustry with external effects.
Regulation and orRanization of an industrv
The performance criteria for individual (private or public) enterprises are derived in our approach from the government policy regarding the industry to which the enterprises belong. An industry is a set of enterprises supplyíng closely related markets, and of rules and institutions serving or coordinating these enterprises. All markets are considered in which commodities are traded that are close substitutes or complements.
Industries are therefore serving multiproduct markets, such as transportation, health or agriculture. Some products may be weakly marketable, i.e., their average operating cost is not covered by the consumers' price, e.g.
urban transport. Other products may be strongly marketable, e.g. private cars. The output of an industry, however, is always assumed to consists of marketable, private goods, possibly with external effects in production or consumption.
- public utilities socialist countries making and even the existing theory (Boiteux, Hotelling a.o.) has been applied to a very limited extent. To this conclusion arrive Deleau (1987) for France and Kay, Mayer and Thompson (1986) for the United Kingdom. It is being realized at this moment how extremely difficult it is to formulate and to implement the objective of "social welfare" which the public manager ought to maximize. But an unambiguous and controlable formulation could be even more dangerous for public enterprises, because it is the government who ultimately specifies it, and the (short term} interests of a government may very easíly conflict with the (long term) interests of an industry.
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The alleged inefficiency of public enterprises and regulated industries is now being cured with measures such as privatization and deregulation. It should be stressed that such measures only work if no serious market failures occur in the industry. Even if all enterprises in the industry produce efficiently, the industry as a whole may perform inefficiently or unsatisfactorily. Efficient bus companies, e.g., may not prevent congestion in urban areas. It seems worthwile to look after other methods than privatization or deregulation in order to improve the efficiency of an industry.
Some industrial policy measures
The first objective of an industrial policy mentioned here is to reduce the social cost of monopoly power. If one wants to leave the industry free, one might (partially) nationalize the monopoly and distribute the profits (see BSs, 1987) . Or, if one wants the enterprises private, one might regulate the industry. A recently adopted measure is the "RPI minus X" formula, proposed by Littlechild (1983) . This means that the rise of the tariff index of a basket of outputs of a public enterprise should not be larger than the UK retail price index minus Xx. Measures that improve the performance of markets and organize an industry are: breaking up the monopoly, and using public firms as policy instruments. This approach has been proposed a.o. by Cremer, Marchand and Thisse (1987) . They show that the introduction of a public firm, with the task to maximize total surplus under a budget constraint, results in a socially superior allocation. A similar approach has been adopted by Harris and Wiens (1980) , Beato and Mas Colell (~984), and De Fraja and Delbono (1986) . The last paper reports that at Nash equilibria, social welfare may be higher when the public firm is instructed to maximize profits rather than total surplus.
A second objective of industrial policy might be to reduce the inefficiency of public firms. BSs (1987) proposes again (partial) privatization of the public enterprise. This influences its objectives, causing a trade off between efficiency and effectivity regarding governmental goals. However, as has been remarked by Yarrow (1986) , it is competition that is the best remedy for the problems mentioned. These suggestions fit perfectly with and can be based upon a general equilibrium model designed by Ruys (1984) and Ruys and van der Laan (198~). In that model the symbiosis of the public infrastructure and the private operations is made explicit. An outline is given in the next section.
The organization of an industrv with external effects
A new concept of goods will be used in the general equilibrium model. It is based on the observation that some private commodities are closely related to public goods, e.g. cars and roads. Such a pair of commodities is called a compound good, if there exists for each agent a feasibility constraint relating a quantity of the private part (called semi private good) with a minimal quantity of the public part (called semi public good) required by that agent. This relation could be represented implicitly in the utility or production function, but will be specified here explicitly and separately. Compound goods are very informative. The demand for the semi private good will be used here as an indicator for the need of the semi public good. confronted with these prices.
The individual tariffs in our model are not determined by the government, but by the (specialized) private firms supplying directly the semi private goods to the market and maximizing profits. They know the customer's behavior much better than a distant government, and compare for example responsive pricing in elasticity or in transport. Since both the firm and the customer have interest in the provision of the semi public good, and on the other hand competition between firms is mitigating excessive tariffs, it is not unreasonable to expect that diversified tariffs cen be set which approximate the individual shadow prices. The revenue of these tariffs is handed over to the (specialized) public institution. This institution has the task to determine the size of the semi public good such that its social cost equals its social benefits. Generally, this boils down to equalize the revenue from the semi-private goods and the production costs of the semi public good. Precise conditions can be found in the papers mentioned above. There it has also been shown that an equilibrium in this economy is Pareto optimal. One may notice that the tax burden is relieved to the amount collected through tariffs.
As an example, we propose some i mplications of this model for the organizatíon of the transportation industry. This industry is charactarized by Some final remarks will be made on the performance of such a mechanism and on problems related with the eventual implementation.
It has been remarked already that in case of external effects which differ in valuation between agents (producers and~or consumers), our mechanism allows for an efficient allocation in the industry and for competition in production. This is made possible by a separation of public and private decisions, together with a correct assignment of social cost and social benefits to the (decentralized) decision units. These decision units have obtained a convexified technology, and have only to decide about (semi)
private goods.
For a good performance of our mechanism it is, firstly, required that there is a real need for coordination between, e.g., the various modes of transport wíthin the industry. For, if the social costs and benefits of these various modes are more or less equal for both producers and consumers, there is no need to inform the decision units.
Secondly, the production units should be relatively small or such that the body deciding about semi-private production can relatively easily be replaced. That is required for competition among producers. 
